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Presence of Capital Flows: And 
Never the Twain Shall Meet, 
Except in East Asia? 
Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
In a recent OECD report, Fischer and Reisen declared that Southeast Asia is a 
contradiction of standard open economy macroeconomics. Specifically: 
. . . In the debate on the European Monetary System, the co-existence of 
exchange stability, free movement of  capital, and monetary  autonomy has 
consequently  been  called the triad of incompatibilities, or the impossible 
trinity. 
However, Singapore and its neighbouring countries, Malaysia and Indo- 
nesia, have been largely (though not continuously) successful in reconciling 
exchange rate stability at competitive levels and a fair amount of monetary 
independence with an open capital account. 
. . .  The success of East Asian countries in achieving the impossible trin- 
ity challenges . . . the Mundell-Fleming framework on which most macro- 
economic analysis of the open (or opening of the) capital account is based. 
The answers are deeper than suggested by research which has not taken into 
account the role of institutions such as public pension funds, state banks or 
public enterprises. . . . To protect the money supply and external competi- 
tiveness from movements in their private capital account, they have to rely 
on positive public savings or mandatory private savings. Once “fiscal com- 
plicity” is given, the art of central banking in Southeast Asia has been shown 
. . .  to retain some monetary autonomy, in spite of free capital flows. (1993, 
67,76-77) 
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Given the attention that this viewpoint has aroused (e.g., Frankel 1993), do we 
have yet another proof of East Asian exceptionalism? 
We think not. To anticipate the analysis, our first conclusion is that substan- 
tial monetary autonomy exists in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore despite 
their “open capital account policies.” The second conclusion is that the mone- 
tary autonomy in these countries comes from the exchange risk premium cre- 
ated by  the general lack of  access to foreign funds, the strong influence that 
the governments have over the arbitrage activities of their domestic banks, and 
the readiness of the monetary authorities to change the rules of the game and 
to engineer perverse exchange rate movements to “cane the speculators.” The 
exchange risk premium consists of more than the conventional portfolio risk 
premium, it also includes the nonzero covered interest differential generated 
by  the preceding list of factors. The third conclusion of  our analysis is that 
monetary authorities should eschew setting up “market-compatible’’ forward 
foreign exchange arrangements to encourage foreign investments, even those 
guided by  theoretical arbitrage conditions, because of  the operational diffi- 
culties of choosing the correct interest rates. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1  1.1 defines the concept of mone- 
tary autonomy that we will use. Section 11.2 decomposes the interest rate dif- 
ferential into three analytical components to assess their relative contributions. 
Section 11.3 uses correlation methods to assess the empirical importance of 
the exchange risk premium by examining the accuracy of the interest rate dif- 
ferential in predicting exchange rate movements. Section 11.4 is a case study 
of Indonesia’s attempt to establish a neutral-incentive forward exchange facil- 
ity for “nonspeculative investments.” Section 11.5 analyzes three national ex- 
periences with speculative attacks on their currencies. Section 11.6 concludes 
the paper. 
11.1  Defining Monetary Autonomy 
Monetary autonomy refers to the extent to which the monetary authorities 
can maintain the money supply at any arbitrary target level that they choose. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, full monetary autonomy is identical to 
having an independent interest rate policy. An independent interest rate is one 
that differs from the sum of the world interest rate and the expected rate of 
currency depreciation by a nonzero risk premium that is manipulable by  poli- 
cies such as capital controls, foreign exchange market interventions, and open 
market operations. A zero risk premium means that bonds denominated in dif- 
ferent currencies have the same expected rate of return because they are perfect 
substitutes for each other, that is, the perfect capital mobility case. 
1. Under the floating exchange regime, a country automatically  has full monetary autonomy, 
but it will not have  an independent  interest rate if  foreign bonds are perfect  substitutes for its 
bonds.  In short, monetary  autonomy  does not  always imply  interest  rate autonomy because it 309  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
The imperfect capital mobility (imperfect asset substitutability) case has an 
upward sloping balance of payments (BP) curve and allows the equilibrium 
interest rate to be any level provided that the IS and LM curves intersect at that 
point of the BP curve.2 We find the assumption that r can deviate any amount 
from r*  + 2 under imperfect capital mobility  to be implausible, especially 
under the fixed exchange rate regime without capital controls. If, as is likely, 
the amount of capital inflow increases disproportionately  with an increase in 
the interest differential, then there is an interest differential beyond which capi- 
tal inflows will overwhelm the ability to conduct sterilized interventions. 
One simple way to amend the imperfect capital mobility case is to add the 
condition: 
1 




minimum domestic interest rate,  r,,,  = r*  + i? - -  , 
where k, is the responsiveness of net private capital flows to a deviation of r 
from r + 2; that is, k, evaluated at r = r*  + 2 is 
k, =  00 for perfect capital mobility, 
kr = 0 for zero capital mobility, 
k, = u  finite positive number, for imperfect capital mobility. 
With this amendment, we have a natural way of comparing degrees of mone- 
tary autonomy under fixed exchange rate for different countries. Consider the 
situation of the money stock being decreased by a one-time open market opera- 
tion. If the resulting interest rate is above r,,,,  then the resulting capital inflow 
will be so massive that  it will  overcome sterilized intervention to keep the 
money stock at the new level and increase the money stock to the level that is 
compatible with rmax. 
This situation is summarized in figure 1  1.1. An open market operation shifts 
LM from LM, to LM,,  and the irresistible capital inflows push LM to LM,.  If 
LM had originally been shifted to LM,,  then sterilized intervention would be 
able to keep it there. 
Figure 11.2 illustrates our concept of monetary autonomy. A country with 
high capital mobility (BP,) has monetary autonomy within the range of money 
stocks that generate LM, and LM,. Whereas a country with low capital mobil- 
ity (BP,) has monetary autonomy within the range given by LM, and LM,.  So 
depends on the exchange rate regime, whereas interest rate autonomy always implies monetary 
autonomy regardless of the exchange rate regime. 
2.  Imperfect capital  mobility produces  an  important  asymmetry. Sterilized  intervention can 
maintain an IS-LM intersection to the left of the BP curve (i.e., when the balance of payments is 
surplus) for a long time, while it can keep an IS-LM intersection to the right of the BP curve only 
until foreign reserves run out. 310  Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
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Fig. 11.1  Constraining of monetary policy by capital flows 
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Fig. 11.2  Defining the degree of monetary autonomy 
a natural measure of the degree of monetary autonomy is the range over which 
LM can be exogenously set. 
11.2  An Accounting Framework 
One way to examine the source of interest autonomy is to adopt an account- 
ing framework for the deviation of the domestic interest rate from the world 
interest rate. The deviation can be decomposed into the following three factors; 
using the 90-day frequency, Indonesia and the United States as the example: 
L+2l  1  + r*  _= [(]I  ++;)  ($[(j(:)][j  ’ 311  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
r= 90-day Indonesian interest rate, 
s  = spot exchange rate expressed as rupiah per dollar, 
f= 90-day forward rate, 
e= expected value of spot exchange rate 90 days thence, 
r* = 90-day U.S. interest rate, 
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (I),  we arrive at 
In  (1 + r) -  In (1 + r*) =  In (1 + r) -  In (1 + r*) -  In (1 +  ~  -)  "'I  S 
S 
Using the approximation of In  (1 + x) =  x  when x  is small, we obtain 
(3)  r -  r*  = [r -  r* - f?)]  + [f+) - (P:)]  + [cz 
We now define 
=  d the forward discount on the rupiah vis-a-vis the dollar 
*-e =  A the portfolio risk premium  (J  ('e)  =  I?  the expected depreciation of the rupiah vis-8-vis the dollar 
(r -  r* -  d)  = a the covered interest differential (country risk premium) 
The final result is 
r -  r*  = [the covered interest differential, a] 
(4)  + [the portfolio risk premium,  A] 
+ [the expected currency depreciation, 21 , 
and we define 
(5)  a + A  = exchange risk premium. 
The covered interest differential, a. Since a is the result of riskless arbitrage, 
the expectation is that a = 0 in the absence of capital controls, political risks, 
and transaction costs. With negligible capital controls on the major European 312  Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
currencies and the U.S. dollar since the late 1970s, the nonzero value of  cx is 
commonly deemed to reflect the costs of currency transactions and borrowing 
and lending interest rate spreads. Furthermore, with increasing financial inno- 
vations,  cx is expected to decrease over time. However, if  risk-averse specula- 
tors fear a possible reimposition of  capital controls in the future, then there 
will be a nonzero a  that reflects a country risk premium; and a fluctuating  (Y 
may reflect the changing probabilities of capital controls being reimposed. 
The portfolio risk premium, A.  In a simple two-country case and assuming that 
a covered interest differential holds (a  = 0) (e.g., Dornbusch  1983), we have 
the portfolio-balance equation: 
A  = +( B-) 
eB*  ’ 
where 
B = stock of outside bonds denominated in rupiah, 
B* = stock of outside bonds demoninated in dollars, 
+ = a coefficient whose magnitude depends on the degree of risk aversion 
The existence of  A is controversial. Frankel  (1 982) and Rogoff (1983) did not 
find it, while Dominguez and Frankel (1992) and Woo (1  987) did. 
Table 1  I.  1 decomposes the interest rate differential (of Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and Singapore vis-&,is  the United States) into three components. The 
values of a,  A,  and e^  do not add up because all terms were calculated by log 
approximations. Component  e^  is calculated from the expected values of  the 
currencies  in  three  months’  time  as reported  in  the  Currency Forecaster’s 
Digest. The dates are arbitrarily chosen to be the beginning and middle of the 
year, and end-of-month data were used (except for the Currency Forecasterk 
Digest data, a point that will be discussed later). 
As a = 0 is the zero-profit  condition for taking risk-free positions in the 
foreign exchange markets, it is reassuring that, in absolute terms, the covered 
interest differential was always very much smaller than the portfolio risk pre- 
mium and the expected depreciation rate. The largest absolute value of covered 
interest differential was 1.1 percent (Canada in February  1990) compared to 
14.1 percent for portfolio risk premium and 17.4 percent for currency appreci- 
ation (both for Japan in August 1989). 
There are several (not mutually exclusive) explanations for why a  does not 
equal zero in table 11.1. The first explanation is the match-up error in timing. 
Our data match only by day and not by time within the same day. This can be 
a serious problem because financial  markets respond to news very  quickly. 
The second explanation is the match-up error in exchange rates. We used the 
exchange rate that is the average of the ask and bid rates, whereas the arbitrage 
relationship requires that the ask and bid rates be used according to the direc- 
and the variance and covariance matrix of rand r*  + 2. Table 11.1  Decomposition of the Interest Rate Differential 
Expected 
Minus Eurodollar  Covered Interest  Portfolio Risk  of Local 
Local Interest  Depreciation 
Country  Interest Rate  Differential”  Premiumh  Currency‘  Error from 
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Source: Calculations provided by  Menzie Cbinn from raw data in various issues of  the Currency 
Forecasreri Digest. 
Gdculated from In (I + d)  = In  (1 + r) -  In (I +r*) -  In (fls). 
bCalculated  as (f  -  e)/s. 
&Calculated  from the expected value of the spot exchange rate three months thence. 314  Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
tion of  the capital flow (It0  1986). The third explanation is the existence of 
transaction costs that make a nonzero (Y consistent with zero profits in arbitrage 
(Keynes 1924). The fourth explanation is that the interest rates used may not 
have the same risk characteristics. The fifth explanation is the differences in 
tax treatment of foreign funds and in tax rates across countries. The sixth ex- 
planation could be the existence, or expected future existence, of capital con- 
trols. 
Most studies on covered interest arbitrage have focused on the existence of 
transaction costs to explain the nonzero a.  The reason for this appears to be 
that these authors limited themselves to the currencies of  the  industrialized 
countries and they regarded existing (if  any), and the probability  of  future, 
capital  controls  in  the  industrialized  countries  to be  insignificant. Branson 
(1969) estimated  the  transaction  cost to be 0.18 percent per annum, while 
Keynes (1924) “guesstimated” it to be 0.5 percent per annum.’ As some trans- 
action costs (e.g., telephone charges) have fallen since Keynes’s time, it may 
be reasonable to regard any absolute value of  (Y  at or above 0.5 percent per 
annum to indicate the existence of a country risk premium. 
Table 11.1 shows that the (Y values for Australia, Canada, and Japan are con- 
sistent with the existence of transaction costs that eliminated the possibility of 
unexploited arbitrage  profit^.^ Only the (Y value for Singapore, 0.5  1 percent per 
annum, is larger than could be justified by normal transaction costs. We will 
argue in section 11.5 that the high value of  ci  in Singapore could be the result 
of Singapore’s tight control of arbitrage activities by domestic banks and by its 
unusual policy reactions to past speculations against its currency. 
The estimates of the portfolio risk premium and the expected currency de- 
preciation rate in table 11.1 should be interpreted cautiously because of pos- 
sible large misalignment errors. The survey by the Currency Forecaster> Di- 
gest on the expected value of the spot rate in 30 days’ time is done on the third 
Thursday of the month, while our forward and spot exchange data are from the 
last trading day in the month. Since the portfolio risk premium for any one 
country in table 11.1 is mostly or overwhelmingly in one direction, it appears 
that the misalignment error, if it exists, may be consistently biased in one direc- 
tion.  In  section  11.3, we  will  point  to partial  evidence  that  indicates  that 
the nonzero portfolio premium is not  an artifact created by the timing  mis- 
alignment. 
The portfolio risk premium indicates that similar maturity bonds denomi- 
3. Frenkel and Levich (197.5) estimated the transaction costs in a 90-day covered interest arbi- 
trage transaction to  be about 0.15 percent (see their table 2), but it seems that they neglected to 
take into account the transaction cost of  acquiring the foreign security (their t*),  which would 
raise the total transaction cost to 0.17. Because Frenkel and Levich’s estimate cannot be easily 
made comparable to the annualized a  estimates in our table 11.1, in Branson (1969),  and in Keynes 
(1924). we have not used their estimate in our discussion. 
4.  The value of 0.45 percent per annum for Japan places it at the upper end of transaction costs. 
This may explain why Bonser-Neal and Roley (l994),  unlike Ito (1986), rejected covered interest 
parity for Japan. 315  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
nated in the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen have to pay higher interest rates 
than U.S. dollar-denominated bonds while those denominated in the Austra- 
lian dollar and Singapore dollar pay lower interest rates. For Canada and Sin- 
gapore, the portfolio risk premium was the biggest contributor to the interest 
rate differential. For Canada, the average absolute size of the portfolio risk 
premium was 3.1 percentage points, while the average absolute expected de- 
preciation was 0.2 percentage point. For Singapore, they were 2.1 and 0.9 per- 
centage points respectively. 
11.3  Looking for the Risk Premium 
The existence of  monetary  autonomy depends on the existence of  a risk 
premium that could be due to a country risk premium (a nonzero covered inter- 
est differential) andor a portfolio risk premium. We will look for the risk pre- 
mium using standard correlation analysis under the maintained hypothesis that 
agents are rational. In the absence of a risk premium, the interest rate differen- 
tial is a good predictor of the subsequent exchange rate change; to see this, set 
a = A  = 0 in equation (4). The converse is that poor predictive capability is 
consistent with the existence of the risk premium. 
In the following three tests, there is decreasing stringency in the criteria of 
what constitutes adequate predictive power. For a zero risk premium, we ex- 
pect a systematic relationship between the magnitudes of the two variables in 
the regression analysis, a systematic relationship between the ranking of the 
magnitudes  in  the  Spearman correlation  coefficient  test,  and  a  systematic 
agreement in signs in the sign test. The interest rate differentials and actual 
subsequent exchange rate movements for Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia are 
shown in figures 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5, respectively. 
Panel A of table 11.2 reports the regression results. Regressions are run with 
and without the constant term, corresponding to the assumption of no risk pre- 
mium or a constant risk premium. If the predictive power is perfect, we would 
expect the coefficient on the interest rate differential to be equal to unity. The 
negative coefficients for Japan and Malaysia clearly reject the interest rate dif- 
ferential as an acceptable predictor of future exchange rate changes. The results 
for Indonesia  are somewhat encouraging but the positive relationship  may 
merely reflect the well-known government policy since 1986 of depreciating 
the exchange rate by 3-5  percent each year (unless an unexpected large exter- 
nal shock happens). 
We now relax the stringency of the link between the change in the value of 
the currency and the interest rate differential. Spearman rank coefficients were 
computed for this pair of  variables to look into a possible loose correlation 
(panel B of table 11.2). Only Indonesia exhibits a fair degree of theoretically 
expected correlation. The t-statistics indicate Malaysia’s rank correlation coef- 
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Fig. 11.5  Malaysia: interest rate differential and ex post exchange rate change 
Panel C of table  1 1.2 reports the sign test of the two variables. A successful 
prediction occurs when both variables have the same sign. Under the null hy- 
pothesis of the two series being random, these predictions  would be correct 
half the time. Indonesia has an unusually high rate of success (50 out of 58), 
and the null  hypothesis  is rejected.  The results for Japan  and Malaysia  are 
dismal. Sample success rates are only 0.44, and the p-values are quite small. 
The results in table  1 1.2 suggest the presence of a risk premium for Japan 
and Malaysia, and possibly the absence of one for Indonesia.s More important, 
since table  11.1  suggests  that  covered  interest  parity  holds  for Japan,  this 
means that the Japanese risk premium found here reflects a nonzero portfolio 
risk premium, indicating that the nonzero portfolio risk premium in table 11.1 
is not an artifact of the timing misalignment between the survey data and the 
forward rates. 
11.4  Indonesia's Experience with Using the Covered Interest Parity 
Condition 
Indonesia removed all controls on capital account transactions  in  1971 in 
recognition  of the fact that there was no effective way  to administer capital 
controls in an economy of  13,000 islands, most of  which are within  a short 
5. Our results are consistent with the finding of  Hansen and Hodrick  (1980, 1983) that risk 
premia exist in the U.S. dollar exchange rate with the currencies of Canada, West Germany, France, 
Britain, Switzerland, Japan, and Italy. 318  Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
Table 11.2  Predictive Power of Interest Rate Differential 
Test 
Indonesia  Japan  Malaysia 
1978:3-1992:4  1973:3-1993:3  1973:2-1992:3 
A. Regression of  Rate of  Actual Currency Depreciation on Interest Rate Differential 
Equation  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Coefficient on r -  r*  1.43  -0.6  -0.11 
Durhin-Watson  1.34  1.27  I .53 
Adjusted R'  -0.07  -0.03  0 
Equation  (1')  (2')  (3') 
(t-statistic)  (2.52)  (0.99)  (0.48) 
Constant term  10.37  -7.17  -0.38 
(t-statistic)  (1.92)  (2.80)  (0.26) 
(2-statistic)  (0.17)  (2.25)  (0.53) 
Coefficient on r -  r*  0.15  -  1.49  -0.16 
Durbin-Watson  1.53  1.4  1.53 
Adjusted R'  0.00  0.05  -0.01 
B. Spearman Rank Coeficient between Rare of  Actual Currency 
Depreciation and Interest Rare Differential 
(t-statistic)  (1.92)  (2.73)  (0.72) 
C. Sign Test for Correct Prediction of  the Direction of  Change 
Spearman rank coefficient  0.25  -0.29  -0.08 
N  58  81  78 
Number of  matching signs  so  36  34 
Proportion of matching signs  0.86  0.44  0.44 
(p-value)  (I  .OO)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
Notes:  The data are quarterly and the interest rate is money market rate for Indonesia, call rate for 
Japan, money market rate for Malaysia, U.S. federal funds rate for the common foreign interest 
rate (these are all line 60B of International Financia/ Statistics [Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, various issues]). 
The exchange rate is number of local currency units per U.S. dollar. 
boat ride of Singapore, a major international commercial and financial center. 
With capital controls, the ease of smuggling would quickly create a huge black 
market  for  illegal export proceeds  already  banked  in  Singapore.  Not  only 
would the controls be futile, their very existence would increase the uncertainty 
perceived by investors and hence increase capital flight. 
In order to encourage foreign investment,  Indonesia sought to reduce the 
exchange rate risk by introducing a swap mechanism in January  1979 to sup- 
plement its slowly developing private forward exchange market. The swap ar- 
rangement had the central bank, Bank Indonesia, simultaneously buying for- 
eign currencies at the current spot exchange rate and entering into a contract 
to sell the same amount of foreign currencies at a specified future point in time 
at the current spot exchange rate. Bank Indonesia would charge a swap margin 
for entering into such an arrangement. 
Bank Indonesia initially set the swap margin at 2.5 percent per annum, with 
the maturity of  the swaps ranging from 30 to  180 days. But this meant  that 
whenever the domestic interest rate was more than 2.5 percentage points above 319  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
the Eurodollar interest rate, there was an opportunity for unlimited profits with 
no risk for the private agents who contracted swap arrangements with Bank 
Indonesia. The resulting enormous periodic demands for swaps forced Bank 
Indonesia to control its exposure to foreign exchange risk by introducing ceil- 
ings on the size of individual transactions, adopting an aggregate swap ceiling, 
and raising the swap margin. 
The swap margin was increased to 4.5 percent in March 1983 and to 8 per- 
cent  in October  1986. Expecting  the  swap margin  of  8 percent to be high 
enough to inhibit short-term speculative movements, the authorities removed 
the individual and aggregate swap ceilings to give long-term investors the full 
benefit of  the swap mechanism. But the high demand for swap transactions 
reappeared after several months when Indonesian interest rates rose relative to 
international interest rates. The swap margin  was raised to 9 percent in the 
second quarter of  1987. 
The government, very sensitive to its laggardness in adjusting the swap mar- 
gin in response to capital inflows, wanted to avoid any delay in lowering the 
swap margin if the interest differential were to drop. An excessive swap margin 
would militate against the objective of  the swap mechanism to induce (non- 
speculative) investments.  With these  concerns in  mind,  the government  de- 
cided in October  1988 to adopt the covered  interest parity  condition as the 
basis for pricing swap transactions. 
The swap margin was “market determined” in that Bank Indonesia set it 
equal to the difference between the average deposit rate for rupiah deposits 
in the Indonesian banking system and the deposit rate for dollar deposits in 
international banks in Singapore. This pricing formula for the swap margin 
was thought  to render foreign  speculators  indifferent between  putting their 
money  in foreign banks or putting them in the Indonesian  banks,  and thus 
to be neutral  in its effects on speculative capital flows. In October  1988, the 
government also extended the maturity of the swap to three years as an added 
incentive to foreign companies to undertake long-term physical capital invest- 
ments in Indonesia. 
One of the present authors pointed out in late 1990 that this covered interest 
parity pricing formula in Indonesia was not neutral in its effect on capital flow. 
It, in fact, subsidized capital inflows6  Neutrality was possible only if the inter- 
est rates used in the pricing were lending rates rather than deposit rates. The 
swap subsidy was the result of the spread between the lending rate and the 
deposit rate being larger in Indonesia than in Singapore. 
To see the subsidy element in the “market-determined” pricing formula, let 
S  = r, -  ri, 
W = r, -  r,* , 
6. This point was also made independently by  Nasution (1991). The basis of his analysis and 
his definition of  subsidy are different from ours. 320  Wing Thye Woo and Kenjiro Hirayama 
where 
r, rupiah deposit interest rate in Indonesia, 
ri dollar deposit interest rate offshore, 
r, rupiah lending rate in Indonesia, 
r; dollar rate offshore. 
If S is the swap margin, a depositor will be indifferent about whether her 
funds were dollar deposits in a Singapore bank or rupiah deposits in an Indone- 
sian bank. If  the swap margin  is smaller than S, there will  be an inflow of 
deposits from Singapore. On the other hand, if the swap margin is larger than 
S, it will not induce a capital outflow because the swap mechanism is a one- 
way mechanism: it guarantees a future exit rupiah-dollar rate for dollars enter- 
ing Indonesia now, but not a future reentry rupiah-dollar rate for rupiahs leav- 
ing Indonesia now. 
then an Indonesian who had to 
borrow for a transaction inside Indonesia would be better off borrowing off- 
shore and using the swap mechanism to cover her position. Again because the 
swap mechanism is one way, a swap premium greater than W will not cause a 
capital outflow. 
If  the swap premium were set less than 
Now, defining 
(9)  r,=r,+m, 
(10) 
where 
r,'  = ri + m*  , 
m = intermediation cost in Indonesia (including the profit margin), 
m*  = intermediation cost offshore (including the profit margin), 
and subtracting equation (1) from equation (9),  we get 
(11)  r, -  r; = (r; -  r,) + (m -  m*) , 
W = S + (m -  m*). 
As we know that m >  in*, we have 
(13)  w>s. 
Since the swap premium was set to be S, there was neutrality only for depos- 
itors but a positive incentive for spenders to borrow from abroad. Specifically, 
the swap rate set by equation (7) gave a subsidy (x) to spenders who borrowed 
from abroad: 
(14) 
swap subsidy to borrowers, 
(15) 
x = r, -  (r; + S)  ; 
x = in -  m* 321  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
There are two reasons why m is greater than m*. The first is that the greater 
inefficiency of the Indonesian banking system translates into higher operating 
costs. The second is that the state banks that dominate the banking system do 
not  compete aggressively  enough among themselves,  and  the result  is that 
banks could have a higher markup over the cost of their deposits. 
In terms of  the theoretical discussion of section  11.1, the existence of the 
swap subsidy (x) means that the actual cost of  external funds is lower than r* 
+ 5. So with the swap mechanism in place, we have 
The value of the floor on the domestic interest rate remains unchanged at 
because the swap mechanism is a one-way mechanism. 
This narrowing of the permissible interest rate band by the decline in r,,,, 
as shown in figure I 1.6, is a reduction in monetary autonomy, as defined earlier 
in figure 11.2. 
The loss in  monetary  autonomy caused by  the swap subsidy was brought 
home forcefully from the second quarter of  1991 onward. The government 
decided to reduce money growth to cool the economy, However, they found 
their credit-tightening efforts significantly attenuated by capital inflows. 
This reduction of monetary autonomy was not the only consequence of the 
swap mechanism. We  also attribute to it the  nondevelopment  of the private 
market for forward foreign exchange in the 1980s despite the drastic deregula- 
tion of the financial system since 1983. The nondevelopment of private forward 
Interest Rate 
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BP without swap subsidy 
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foreign exchange activities had less to do with the incapacity  of the private 
sector to create a sophisticated forward exchange market than with the exis- 
tence of a subsidized swap mechanism paid for by  public funds. The veracity 
of  the proposition  that the swap mechanism had suppressed the growth of a 
private forward market can be seen in the quick growth of the private forward 
market after the swap mechanism was suddenly eliminated in November 1991. 
The swap mechanism  was terminated  after its abetment of capital inflows 
was pointed out and confirmed by  the huge capital inflows that occurred  in 
1991, when the swap subsidy (x)  ranged from 2 to 6 percentage points. There 
were two reasons why the government decided to abandon the swap mecha- 
nism completely rather than to reset the formula using lending rates instead: 
1. Just as the pedagogical  device of a single interest rate glosses over the 
distinction between  the deposit  rate and the lending  rate, there is no single 
lending rate. Getting the appropriate loan rate to use is a particularly serious 
problem because it is much harder to identify loans to projects with compara- 
ble risks across countries than to identify deposits in banks with comparable 
risks across countries. Using the prime rates of different countries is one possi- 
bility, but prime rates tend to be rather rigid and hence not good indicators of 
current credit conditions. 
2.  Indonesia has a history of occasional large discrete devaluations (the last 
one was 35 percent at the end of  1986), and the swap contracts caused major 
financial losses to Bank Indonesia. Such losses are inevitable with any state- 
sponsored swap mechanism, and the use of a different interest rate does not 
solve this basic problem. 
11.5  Can Caning the Speculators Avoid the Impossible Trinity? 
As will be seen, we agree with the primary conclusion in Fischer and Reisen 
(1993) that Malaysia and Singapore have been able to undertake sterilized in- 
tervention to a greater extent than the countries in the European Monetary Sys- 
tem, but we differ with them on the applicability of standard macroeconomic 
theory to these countries. In particular, we view the Southeast Asian experi- 
ences as confirming, rather than refuting,  the impossible  trinity proposition 
that in the absence of effective capital controls, money growth cannot be set at 
any arbitrary rate without undermining the exogenously preset level (or depre- 
ciation rate) of the exchange rate. The case for our view can be seen in the 
following three episodes of policy  responses to speculative attack on the lo- 
cal currency. 
The first episode is Singapore in the last quarter of 1985, when GDP fell 5.5 
percent on an annualized basis. A major contribution to the sharp slowdown 
was the excessive real wage growth in the previous years. At the beginning of 
the  decade,  the government had decided  to restructure the industrial  sector 
toward  high  value-added  industries  by  ordering  high  annual  real  wage  in- 
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toward more capital-intensive and technology-intensive modes of production 
caused Singapore’s wages to increase by  more than 60 percent in U.S. dollars 
over the 1980-84  period while Hong Kong’s wages hardly changed. The out- 
come was a major loss in competitiveness which together with the economic 
stagnation in the industrialized countries resulted in a steady decline in growth 
rates during 1984. In  1985, Singapore had its first negative growth experience 
since it became independent in 1965. 
The Singapore dollar had depreciated  quite steadily during 1984 with the 
slowdown in export earnings and economic growth (see fig.  11.7). When the 
negative growth in 1985 became obvious in mid-1985, foreign exchange mar- 
ket participants, sensing a possible big devaluation of the Singapore dollar to 
restore Singapore’s competitiveness, began a run on the currency. The end-of- 
period exchange rate went from S$2.19 per U.S. dollar in July 1985 to S$2.27 
per U.S. dollar in August  1985. 
The government reacted to Singapore’s loss of international competitiveness 
by  cutting  labor cost through  reductions  in  the hefty payroll  tax  and social 
security contributions instead of through currency depreciation as anticipated 
by  the speculators because it viewed the latter as importing inflation.  More 
interesting, simultaneous with the shift in fiscal policy to correct the balance- 
of-payments problem, Singapore used its ample foreign reserves to appreciate 
the Singapore dollar. The exchange rate was S$2. I3 per U.S. dollar in Septem- 
ber and October, S$2.09 per U.S.  dollar in November,  and S$2.11 per U.S. 
dollar  in  December. The exchange  rate averaged S$2.18  per U.S.  dollar in 
1986. In the bottom-line language of the business community, as headlined in 
Singapore I/  US I 
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the financial press, the chairman of  the Monetary Authority of Singapore had 
“caned the speculators.” 
This “caning” episode confirms the impossible trinity. Exchange rate slabil- 
ity was maintained  without resort to capital controls, but it involved a fiscal 
policy adjustment and a massive buying of the Singapore dollar by  the mone- 
tary authorities, which meant shrinking the money supply to accommodate the 
speculative drop in money demand, At least U.S.$400 million of reserves were 
sold between  September  13 and  18, and this massive shrinkage of liquidity 
caused the interbank overnight  rate to  reach  120 percent  (on an  annualized 
basis) on September  17. Monetary  autonomy was certainly compromised in 
order to peg the exchange rate (see fig. 1 1.8). 
The second episode is Malaysia in January  1994. For Malaysia,  1993 was 
another boom year; economic growth was 8 percent as in the year before. This 
sustained high-growth performance attracted capital flows that appreciated the 
ringgit from 2.61 per U.S. dollar in January  1992 to 2.55 per  U.S.  dollar in 
December  1993. The final months of  1993 saw large capital inflows and for- 
ward buying of the ringgit in anticipation of further ringgit appreciation. 
On January 11, 1994, the government responded with two measures to quell 
the speculation. The first was to raise the reserve requirement on time deposits 
held by foreigners. The banks, to protect their profit margins, immediately low- 
ered the deposit rate on foreign funds. The second measure was to limit the 
amount of foreign funds that could be placed in interest-earning accounts. The 
result of  this discrimination against foreign funds was a capital outflow that 
plunged the ringgit to 2.73 per U.S. dollar on January  17. 
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When the government followed up with a ban on the sale of money market 
instruments to foreigners on January 24, the ringgit fell to 2.76 per U.S.  dollar. 
We thus have another example of a government engineering an opposite move- 
ment of the currency in order to inflict losses on the currency speculators. 
If  we regard the prohibition of  capital movements as an extreme form of 
discrimination against foreign capital, then the legal requirement in Malaysia 
of paying a lower (or no) interest rate on foreign deposits is a moderate form 
of capital control. The no-interest-payment policy is a form of capital control 
that uses price to discourage capital inflow as compared with the traditional 
practice of  using a quantity quota to contain the volume of inflow. So while 
Malaysia had caned the speculators without compromising monetary auton- 
omy, it had to interfere with the free flow of capital in order to do so. 
The third episode is Indonesia in June  1987 and February  1991. In both 
instances, the government halted the run on the rupiah by ordering state enter- 
prises to withdraw the bulk of their funds from the banking system and pur- 
chase central bank certificates.’ In both cases, the high interest rates created 
by the liquidity squeeze convinced speculators of the government’s resolve to 
support the exchange rate, and capital held abroad returned to Indonesia. With 
this, the overnight interbank rate that had jumped from 17.6 percent in January 
1991 to 26.9 percent in March 1991 fell to 11.3 percent in May  1991. These 
two Indonesian monetary shock therapies are clearly cases of compromising 
monetary autonomy to maintain the value of the exchange rate and confirm the 
impossible trinity. 
The actions by  Malaysia and Singapore to move the exchange rate in the 
counterintuitive direction are rare events in international experience. Italy wid- 
ened its exchange rate band to accommodate the greater and more frequent 
speculative bouts on the lira, and Britain devalued by  leaving the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism when the pound was under attack. The different national re- 
actions suggest many interesting possibilities. 
One is that counterpunches used to punish speculators may hurt the econ- 
omy in the process, but the economic cost of these counterpunches may be 
lower in East Asia. While such a possibility is hard to assess definitively be- 
cause different governments may have different thresholds for economic dis- 
tress, we think that an important reason for the different national responses to 
speculative attacks is that it is technically easier for Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore than for European  countries to influence their  foreign  exchange 
markets. 
We see three factors that make it technically easier for these Southeast Asian 
countries to face down the speculators. The first is that private capital flows 
into and out of these Asian countries (not counting the pure offshore transac- 
tions in Singapore) are much smaller than those of Western Europe. Most busi- 
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nesses (especially in Indonesia) do not meet the creditworthiness criteria of 
international banks and hence do not have access to foreign credit. Further- 
more, Malaysia and Indonesia have carefully limited the entry and activities of 
foreign banks. 
The second factor is the great influence that the governments have on banks 
either through regulation  or through ownership. Singapore requires banks to 
submit daily reports on their foreign exchange transactions and to get approval 
for large transfers of  foreign currencies. Quasi  state banks and  state banks 
dominate the Malaysian and Indonesian financial sectors and foreign exchange 
dealing, and their managers understand that respecting the wishes of the cen- 
tral bank may be more important than profit maximization. 
It is well known that the two largest Malaysian banks  (Malayan Banking 
and Bank Bumiputra; the government is the major shareholder in both), which 
dominate  the  money  market,  coordinate  their  transactions  with  the  central 
bank. The close relationship between the central bank and these banks is well 
illustrated by the recent appointment of the president of Malayan Banking to 
the governorship of  the central bank. So if the central bank is intervening to 
push the exchange rate against the tide, it would be career termination for bank 
managers to take a speculative position opposite to that of the government even 
though  it would be likely to enhance bank profits. The usual outcome under 
this career constraint is that the large banks would  start assuming positions 
that support the government’s actions and slow down the processing of foreign 
exchange transactions. 
In short, given that profitability is not the sole objective of the large South- 
east Asian banks, their response to changes in interest rate differentials is pred- 
icated on the government’s view of how their funds should be invested. In the 
absence of profit-maximizing  actions by the biggest players in the foreign ex- 
change markets, it is not necessary  for the government  to introduce explicit 
capital controls to slow down capital flows. 
Finally, the third factor that makes sterilization easier in Southeast Asia than 
in Europe comes from the willingness of the Southeast Asian governments to 
take extreme measures, such as massive monetary contractions and alterations 
of  the rules on interest payments, in order to bring the fundamentals in line 
with the existing value of  the exchange rate. These actions, backed  by  large 
foreign reserves, have created large risk premia that international speculators 
need  to be  compensated  for if  they  are to  speculate  against  the  Southeast 
Asian currencies. 
All of these three factors make it easier for the Indonesian, Malaysian, and 
Singapore governments to influence the exchange rate because they lower capi- 
tal mobility. It is our conjecture that the risk premium generated by these fac- 
tors consists of  a country risk premium as well as the conventional portfolio 
premium. This may be why covered interest parity did not hold for Singapore 
in table 11.1. In brief, these factors create a risk premium that widens the span 
between r,,,  and r,,,,,  and gives greater monetary autonomy to the government. 327  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
11.6  Conclusion 
Our simple empirical investigations suggest that interest rate linkages may 
be loose enough that it is possible to conduct independent monetary policy, at 
least within a limited range. A necessary condition for independent monetary 
policy  is the existence of risk premia, and we found evidence of them (1) in 
the decomposition of the interest rate differential and (2) in the failure of the 
interest rate differential to predict even the sign of  the subsequent exchange 
rate change correctly,  under the maintained  hypothesis  of  rational  expecta- 
tions. 
Our examination of Indonesia’s use of the covered interest parity condition 
to formulate an incentive-neutral swap mechanism to cope with capital flows 
shows that it actually subsidized capital inflows. The result was a reduction 
in  Indonesia’s  monetary  autonomy. The subsidy  element  could be removed 
by  using lending rates instead of  deposit rates in the pricing of  swaps. But 
the difficulty of deciding which lending rate to use renders the fix nonopera- 
tional. 
The analysis of three episodes of speculative attacks suggests that the ability 
of  the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singapore monetary authorities to turn the 
tables on the speculators comes from the thinness of their foreign exchange 
markets and the domination of these markets by domestic banks whose arbi- 
trage activities are closely supervised by their governments. We think that the 
combination of the governments’ influence on the foreign market transactions 
of the domestic banks, the governments’ readiness to change the rules of  the 
game, and the governments’ willingness to shock their own economies in order 
to punish currency speculators is the reason for the large and persistent devia- 
tions  from covered interest  arbitrage  for Malaysia  and  Singapore  noted  in 
Chinn and Frankel (1994). 
To see this, consider a foreign investor who invested her funds in a time- 
deposit account in Malaysia and had covered her position with a forward sale 
of ringgit. Assuming that the covered interest differential was zero at the time 
of the contract, the investor was in a zero-loss situation. But if the Malaysian 
government (as it did in January 1994)  were then to ban the payment of interest 
to foreigners, the investor would suffer a loss. 
If  the investor had assumed nonzero probability  of  such an action by the 
Malaysian government from the very beginning, then the covered interest dif- 
ferential that would emerge would be nonzero even in the absence of transac- 
tion costs. Furthermore,  if the investor were risk averse, the fact that a time 
deposit is no longer a riskless asset means that a portfolio risk premium would 
also be present. 
We end this paper with some words of caution. We have taken it for granted 
that monetary autonomy is desirable because it confers flexibility on the gov- 
ernment’s macroeconomic  management. But we have seen that this monetary 
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example, the state bank’s compromising its maximization of  profits to allow 
the government  to cane the speculators and the government’s willingness to 
impart interest rate shocks to the domestic economy in order to execute the 
punishment. Clearly, we must not be so obsessed with monetary autonomy that 
we do not consider the microeconomic costs of obtaining it. 
Even more important, we want to avoid giving the impression that the South- 
east Asian governments  can always succeed in caning the speculators. They 
succeeded in the past only because they interfered with capital flows andor 
changed their macroeconomic policies to bring the fundamentals back in line 
with the value of the exchange rate. The successful caning of speculators came 
from the heavy influence that the governments had on the fundamentals that 
affected the values of their exchange rates and not from the governments’ abil- 
ity to anticipate the future better than private speculators. This point is demon- 
strated by the large losses suffered by the Malaysian central bank in 1992 when 
it speculated on Britain’s staying in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
The Malaysian central bank was caned by  private speculators because it did 
not possess better information on the fundamentals that determined the value 
of the pound vis-a-vis the currencies of the other industrialized countries. Or 
to put it differently, the Malaysian central bank lost in this speculation because 
it did not possess the same means to influence the pound-dollar exchange rate 
as it does the ringgit-dollar exchange rate. 
References 
Bonser-Neal, Catherine, and V.  Vance Roley. 1994. Are Japanese interest rates too sta- 
ble? Journal of  International Money and Finance  I3(3): 29 1-3  18. 
Branson, William. 1969. The minimum covered interest differential needed for interna- 
tional arbitrage activity. Journal of  Political Economy 77(6): 1028-35. 
Chinn, Menzie D., and Jeffrey Frankel. 1994. Financial links around the Pacific Rim: 
1982-1992. In Exchange rate policy and interdependence: Perspectives,frorn the Pa- 
cifc  Basin, ed. R. Click and M. Hutchison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dominguez, Kathryn, and Jeffrey Frankel.  1992. Does foreign exchange intervention 
matter?  Disentangling the  portfolio  and expectations effects.  Working Paper  no. 
C92-001.  Berkeley: Center for International and Development Economics Research, 
University of  California, February. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1983. Exchange risk and the macroeconomics of exchange rates 
determination.  In The internationalization  of  $financial markets and national  eco- 
nomic policy, ed. R. Hawkins, R. Levich, and C. Wihlborg. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI. 
Fischer, Bernhard, and Helmut Reisen. 1993. Liberalising  capitalJlows in developing 
countries: Pitfalls, prerequisites and perspectives. Paris: Development Studies Cen- 
tre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Frankel, Jeffrey.  1982. In search of  the exchange risk premium: A  six-currency test 
assuming mean-variance optimization. Journal of  International Money and Finance 
. 1993. Sterilization of money inflows: Difficult (Calvo) or easy (Reisen)? Work- 
l(3): 255-74. 329  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
ing Paper no. 93-024.  Berkeley: Center for International and Development Econom- 
ics Research, University of California, October. 
Frenkel, Jacob, and Richard Levich.  1975. Covered interest arbitrage:  Unexploited 
profits? Journal of Political Economy 83(2): 325-38. 
Hansen, Lars, and Robert Hodrick. 1980. Forward exchange rates as optimal predic- 
tions of  future spot rates: An  econometric analysis. Journal of  Political Economy 
. 1983. Risk averse speculation in  the forward foreign exchange market: An 
econometric analysis of linear models. In Exchange rates and international macro- 
economics, ed. Jacob Frenkel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ito, Takatoshi. 1986. Capital controls and covered interest parity between the yen and 
the dollar. Economics Study Quarterly 37(3): 223-41. 
Keynes, John. 1924. Monetary reform. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 
Nasution, Anwar. 1991. Swap facility and implicit government guarantees on foreign 
borrowings by private sector are germs of Indonesia’s own destruction. University of 
Indonesia, May. Manuscript. 
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1983. On the effects of sterilized intervention: An analysis of weekly 
data. Working Paper no. DM/83/41. Washington, D.C.: Research Department, Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. 
Woo, Wing Thye. 1987. Some evidence of speculative bubbles in the foreign exchange 
markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 19(4): 499-5  14. 
Woo, Wing Thye, Bruce Glassburner, and Anwar Nasution. 1994. Macroeconomic cri- 
ses and  long-term growth: The case oj  Indonesia, 1965-1990.  Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Press. 
88(5): 829-53. 
Comment  Ronald I. McKinnon 
Do international capital flows limit national monetary autonomy? In answering 
this most interesting question, the authors divide their paper into two parts 
which are only loosely related. 
The first, and least successful, part applies high-powered econometrics to a 
large database in search of “the” elusive risk premium in interest differentials. 
A bit dubiously, they want to use estimates of  the risk premium as a measure 
of monetary autonomy in the country in question. 
The second part (sections 11.4 and 11.5) is a fascinating discussion of how 
the monetary authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore lean on domes- 
tic banks and other institutions associated with international capital flows to 
give their central banks a measure of  independence in formulating monetary 
policy-of  which the exchange rate itself is an important part. As long as the 
fundamentals for the exchange rate were right, the government could even use 
its massive weight in the market to “cane” speculators for trying to move the 
rate in the wrong direction. 
In the Indonesian case, a further dilemma arises in setting forward rates of 
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exchange when the capital account is open on the one hand but the domestic 
financial  system remains  somewhat repressed with  a  substantial wedge be- 
tween deposit and loan rates of interest on the other. Although the authors show 
that the Indonesian authorities may have stumbled a bit in handling the prob- 
lem, students of  development  finance will recognize it as a fundamental di- 
lemma when a country inverts the optimum order of economic liberalization 
(McKinnon 1993). If  a country decides (perhaps because it has no choice) to 
open the capital account of the balance of payments before fully liberalizing 
its domestic banking system, problems of foreign exchange management can 
be acute. 
The Elusive Risk Premium 
In the first part of the paper, the authors borrow a large, impersonal database 
with survey data on expected exchange rate changes “matched” with forward 
rate and short-term interest rate quotations against the U.S. dollar for Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and Singapore monthly from February 1988 to February 1991. 
The fact that covered interest differentials are not zero, however, suggests that 
these forward and interest rate quotations are not precisely matched-through 
time or in the relevant offshore or onshore market. 
More important to the authors, however, is to measure “the” risk premium, 
roughly the extent by which the domestic interest rate exceeds the U.S. dollar 
rate by more than the domestic currency is expected to depreciate, for each of 
the four countries. “The existence of monetary autonomy depends on the exis- 
tence of a risk premium that could be due to a country risk premium . . . and/ 
or a  the  portfolio  risk  premium”  (sec.  11.3). Unfortunately,  their  complex 
econometric analysis does not seem very robust. But the remarkably high risk 
premium of 3.1 percentage points estimated for Canada seems consistent with 
political risk: Canada could break up with the secession of Quebec. 
The general problem with the authors’ approach, however, is that most risk 
premia vary through time rather than being a single number that reflects politi- 
cal risk of  long standing-such  as Canada’s. Indeed, implicit in the authors’ 
analysis is a second, distinctly different concept of the risk premium: the inter- 
est differential varying with the short-run ebb and flow of domestic monetary 
policy relative to America’s. As long as capital is imperfectly mobile, a rela- 
tively tight domestic monetary policy will force domestic interest rates above 
U.S. levels, generating a positive risk premium in the short run, and with easy 
money “the” risk premium becomes negative. But there is no one number to 
estimate from a multiyear data series, and whether the terminology “risk pre- 
mium” is at all appropriate for this second concept is questionable. Better to 
call it just the “monetary residual” in the interest differential. 
In short, I think the authors should try to measure the degree of capital mo- 
bility, that is, their u  parameter, more directly rather than reducing the problem 
to the estimation of a single-valued risk premium. 331  Monetary Autonomy in the Presence of Capital Flows 
Indonesia’s Swap Margin 
In order to encourage foreign investment-or,  more accurately, short-term 
foreign borrowing by Indonesians-Bank  Indonesia  simultaneously bought 
foreign currencies at the current spot exchange rate and entered into a contract 
to sell the same amount of foreign currencies at a specified future point in time 
at the then-current spot exchange rate. According to the authors, Bank Indone- 
sia initially set the swap margin too low, at 2.5  percentage points per annum, 
with the maturity of the swaps ranging from 30 to 80 days. 
The high demand for such swaps was due to  the fact that the borrowing 
rate in Indonesia was much higher than the deposit rate. So even though 2.5 
percentage points fairly reflects  the gap between the deposit rate in rupiahs 
versus that in dollars, illiquid Indonesians facing a much higher borrowing rate 
would still want to borrow “too much”-particularly  if they could cover for- 
ward with the government’s swap facility. But if the swap rate was made much 
higher to deter borrowers as the authors wanted (probably correctly), the im- 
plicit forward rate would no longer be an unbiased estimate of the spot rate 
expected in the future. The rupiah would be overly discounted, and importers 
would not want to use such a rate to buy dollars forward. 
In general, as long as there is a big wedge between the deposit and loan rates 
of interest, no forward exchange rate will clear the market properly. No one 
forward rate will more or less accurately reflect the spot rate expected in the 
future without “penalizing” one group or another. Thus, a cost to the Indone- 
sian economy of operating with a repressed domestic banking system, one with 
with a large wedge between deposit and loan rates, is a missing market, that 
is, a well-functioning, thick market in forward exchange. 
If  the government contracts forward with one group or another to partially 
fill this gap, possibly creating windfall profits andor losing monetary control, 
moral hazard is very high indeed. Perhaps the government should simply stay 
out of the forward exchange market altogether as the authors suggest. More 
positively, this forward exchange dilemma is another reason why the Indone- 
sian  authorities  should liberalize domestic  finance.  By  eliminating onerous 
bank  reserve  requirements  and  subsidized  loans  to  favored  borrowers,  the 
wedge between deposit and free market loan rates can be reduced toward levels 
prevailing on world markets. 
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Comment  Basant K. Kapur 
Woo and Hirayama have written an interesting and wide-ranging paper, explor- 
ing a number  of  issues relating to capital  flows and monetary  autonomy in 
various East Asian countries. My comments will deal, first, with certain central 
theoretical  considerations  in  their argument and, second, with more specific 
aspects of some of their country studies. At the theoretical level, I would like 
to begin by making three observations: 
1. As is well known, the IS-LM-BP framework that the authors employ is 
a short-term, flow-oriented construct and-unless  considerably elaborated- 
cannot do full justice to stock adjustment dynamics. 
2. There is a curious dichotomy in the literature between the view, prevalent 
in open economy macroeconomics,  that asset markets adjust instantaneously 
and the common empirical finding of a lagged adjustment in the market for 
money, which has been given a plausible theoretical underpinning in, among 
others, the “buffer stock” approach  advanced by Milbourne  (1  987), Laidler 
(1984), and others. Unless monetary disequilibria are reflected entirely in op- 
posite  goods-market  disequilibria,  which  is unlikely,  adjustment  lags in the 
money market will entail lags in other asset markets as well. 
3. As Woo and Hirayama correctly point out, portfolio balance models gen- 
erally incorporate stocks of “outside bonds,” the supplies of which (particularly 
in the case of domestic bonds) are exogenous. However, their empirical work 
uses interest rates on domestic vis-a-vis offshore bank deposits, which are not 
outside assets. An excess demand for domestic bank loans can, for example, 
through  incipient  loan  and  deposit  interest  rate  movements  induce  reserve 
flows and thereby domestic deposit expansion. 
What is the implication of the three foregoing observations? Woo and Hiray- 
ama are correct, in my view, in ascribing a significant part of the interest differ- 
ential in various countries between domestic and foreign assets to the existence 
of a portfolio risk premium. This was, in fact, also the conclusion from a study 
on Singapore conducted a few years ago (Ariff, Kapur, and Tyabji, in press), 
which also found that the Singapore-US. exchange rate could be modeled as 
a random walk without drift. However, Woo and Hirayama jump too easily 
from the demonstration  of  the existence of  a portfolio  risk premium to the 
conclusion that there exists some-limited-monetary  autonomy in the coun- 
tries concerned. The time dimension is, in my view, crucial. In the very short 
run, owing to the adjustment lags 1 have discussed under point 2 above, there 
may  indeed  be  some monetary  autonomy. However,  beyond  the  very  short 
run-in  other words, beyond a period of, probably, six months at the most- 
reserve flows are likely to occur (point 3 above) to serve to reequilibrate asset 
supplies and demands at the same risk premium as had prevailed  previously. 
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The monetary autonomy is therefore not only limited but also temporary, and 
it is questionable whether such temporary monetary autonomy is of much use 
to policymakers from a macroeconomic standpoint. 
The foregoing discussion also implies, from an analytical standpoint, that a 
distinction should be drawn between “temporary” imperfect capital mobility- 
based  on asset  adjustment  lags-and  “permanent”  imperfect capital  mobil- 
ity-based  genuinely on imperfect asset substitutability. One could even have 
a combination of the two, or of their consequences: there could exist a portfolio 
risk premium,  implying  imperfect asset substitutability, and yet at the same 
time the resulting interest differential would not be capable of manipulation by 
monetary authorities outside of the very short run because the supplies of the 
assets concerned are endogenous. 
Finally, some more specific points: 
1. It is doubtful whether in Singapore there does exist any deviation, even 
a small one, from covered interest parity, as the authors claim. Empirical stud- 
ies on Singapore have failed to uncover any such deviation,’ and the authors’ 
findings may, as McKinnon has said, well be the result of measurement error. 
2. In the Indonesian case, an examination of how widespread the access (of 
Indonesians) to the swap facility was would certainly be useful, since imper- 
fect access could well imply some flexibility in the rupiah deposit rate around 
its covered interest parity value. 
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